Brazil’s Economic Stagnation

Brazil is a poster child for the “middle-income trap,” the phenomenon that keeps developing economies from narrowing the wealth gap with wealthy countries once they have reached a moderate level of prosperity. As is typical for many emerging market countries which are over-dependent on commodity exports and foreign capital inflows, the Brazilian economy experiences frequent boom-to-bust cycles, the latest being the commodity/liquidity/credit-fueled consumption boom of 2003- 2013 which was followed by a deep recession in 2014-2017. The overall result is mediocre growth. Brazil’s GPD per capita relative to the high-income economies is at the same level as in 1960, and actually has deteriorated significantly since the late 1970s.

A recent paper by Jorge Arbache and Sarquis J. B. Sarquis, Growth Volatility and Economic Growth in Brazil (Arbache-Sarquis) argues that Brazil’s poor performance is tied to the high volatility of the economy which in turn is caused by uncertain commodity prices and capital flows and their effects on currency valuation. It makes intuitive sense that volatility would hurt growth; boom-to-bust cycles are inefficient, as economic agents over-indulge in good times and retreat in bad times. Volatility also makes it difficult for both the public and private sector to plan and budget long term investments.

Brazil’s economic volatility is caused by well-known factors:

  • Chronic low savings and high current account deficits financed by fickle foreign capital flows.
  • Exports dominated by commodities, and the current account highly impacted by commodity prices. High commodity prices improve the current account which lowers country risk premia and leads to higher foreign financial and investment When commodity prices fall, the process unwinds.
  • Pro-cyclical currency valuation. The currency appreciates during good times and weakens during busts. During currency appreciations manufacturers lose export competitiveness and focus on growing domestic consumption.
  • Monetary policies dictated by the U.S. Fed. The deep recession of 1981-83 was triggered by U.S. Fed Volcker’s high interest rates imposed to wage his war on inflation. The boom of the last decade was fueled by Fed-fueled global liquidity.
  • Pro-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies; fiscal expansion during booms and retraction during busts. During the current deep recession in Brazil, the authorities have both increased real interest rates and tightened fiscal spending.
  • Chronic fiscal imbalances cause uncertainty and high country risk premia.

The current boom-bust cycle has been particularly destructive for Brazil. The china-induced commodity boom caused excessive currency appreciation, a credit-fueled consumption surge and severe deindustrialization.  In sharp contrast to successful Asian economies that have promoted the exports of manufactured goods, Brazil has evolved prematurely into a service economy. 76% of jobs in the Brazilian economy are now generated by the service sector, and the great majority of these jobs are low-skill, low wage jobs. Manufacturing’s share of GDP has fallen from 34% in 1980 to 10% in 2015, and Brazil has become increasingly dependent on commodity exports.

Brazil’s Central Bank has pursued inflation-targeting, the latest fashion for global monetary authorities, with abandon. During the past decade and especially the past three years of deep recession, Brazil has consistently had the highest real interest rates in the world. The famous dictum voiced by former Finance Minister Mario Henrique Simonsen  — “A inflação incomoda, mas o câmbio mata (Inflation bothers but the foreign exchange rate kills.“ ) has been entirely forgotten.

How can Brazil avoid boom-bust cycles in the future? As Arbache and Sarquis state in their paper, given Brazil’s history it is better to aim to grow in a stable and sustained manner than to seek high rates of growth. Solving chronic fiscal and foreign account imbalances are at the center of any reduction in volatility. On the foreign account side, it would be imperative for Brazil to maintain a competitive currency to promote domestic manufacturing and gradually diversify from commodities.

However, Brazil’s poor economic performance is only partially explained by volatility. More importantly, Brazil does poorly in human capital development and in providing a good environment for business. Steady improvement in both these areas would boost sustainable growth. Unfortunately, Brazil has shown no progress in these areas. Its ranking in the United Nations Human Development Index has fallen from 69 to 79 over the past 15 years. Ditto for the World Bank’s Doing Business survey which ranks countries in terms of the quality of the regulatory and institutional framework for business and where Brazil has shown no progress whatsoever.  Brazil ranks a miserable 123rd on the list, lower than 119 in 2006, and the worst performing of the major emerging markets except for India.

 

Us Fed watch:

Brazil Watch :

India Watch :

China Watch:

  • Beijing’s New Airport (Caixing)
  • Xi Jinping’s War on Financial Crocodiles (FT)

China Technology Watch:

  • China aims to be a leader in 5G  technology (WIC)
  • China Shows off New Generation of High-Speed Trains (Caixin)
  • CRRC Wins Train Supply Deal in Montreal (Caixin)
  • Chinese Phones Take over Indian Market (SCMP)

China Consumer Watch:

  • China’s aging (Bloomberg)
  • P&G Refocuses Strategy on Premiumisation ( SCMP)

Eastern Europe Watch:

Poland is breaking out of the Middle-Income Trap (NY Times)

Commodity Watch:

  • Oil’s Game of Chicken; Can OPEC Finally Bankrupt U.S. Production (Seeking Alpha)
  • Will U.S. Drillers Drive Oil Prices Into the Ground (Fed Up)
  • Temasek on Chinese Overinvestment (CNBC.com)
  •  China’s Steel Overcapacity (Peterson Institute)

Technology Disruption Watch:

Anti-Globalization Watch:

Emerging Markets Investor Watch:

Notable Blogs:

Notable Quotes:

“The biggest unknowable is that you have the illusion of liquidity. You have people who promise overnight liquidity that have taken quite illiquid positions, particularly lending to various entities. As long as the party continues that’s fine, but should this liquidity be tested it’s not going to be as deep as people think.” – Mohamed El-Erian

“When the markets finally do break, as they always have historically, ETFs and index funds will be destabilizing influences, because fear will enter the marketplace. A higher percentage of assets will be in indexed funds and ETFs. Investors will hit the “sell” button. All you have to ask is two words, “To whom?” To whom do I sell? Index funds and ETFs don’t carry any cash reserves. The active managers have been diminished in size, and most of them aren’t carrying high levels of liquidity for fear of business risk.” (Bob Rodriguez – We are witnessing the development of a “perfect storm”(seeking alpha)

“Stock prices are likely to be among the prices that are relatively vulnerable to purely social movements because there is no accepte theory by which to understand the worth of stocks….investors have no model or at best a very incomplete model of behavior of prices, dividend, or earnings, of speculative assets.” (Robert Schiller)