The Beautiful Deleveraging From Financial Repression

Historically, the most effective manner to reduce excess debts held by the government and the public at large has been to inflate it away. This tool has been successfully implemented both by emerging markets and developing countries, most significantly by the U.S. during the 1950s. We see it at work once again today in a big way, with some countries making remarkable progress at reducing debt levels.

Financial repression consists of imposing negative real returns on the holders of fixed income securities by allowing inflation to be higher than interest rates. This can be done either through Central Bank monetary policy or by regulators forcing financial agents to hold unattractive securities. The winners in this game are the debtors at the expense of the creditors, which can lead to a significant redistribution of wealth.  For example, the archetypical old lady living off interest payments suffers badly, while the millennial with a fixed mortgage gains handsomely. Governments with high debt levels are big winners.

The chart below shows the one-year evolution of total debt to GDP (left side) and government debt to GDP (right side) for a broad group of emerging market and developed economies, based on Bank For International Settlements (BIS) data through December 2022. These numbers show the remarkable different paths countries have taken over this period. Most remarkably, highly indebted countries in Europe (UK, Spain, Italy) have achieved large reductions in total debt to GDP ratios through financial repression. For example, negative interest rates in the UK have brought the total debt to GDP ratio down by 52.4 percentage points, from 297.5% to 245.1%, and government debt to GDP, from 134.2% to 93.7%.  British monetary authorities must be delighted at the result of their policies, which they have continued to pursue through the first semester of 2023. China, on the other hand, with massive debt accumulating at a  furious pace, saw its total debt to GDP ratio rise from 285.1% to 297.2% and government debt to GDP rise from 71.7% to 77.7%, mainly because overcapacity and malinvestment have persistent deflationary effects.

In emerging markets, most countries have benefited from financial repression. In addition to China, Korea, South Africa and Argentina can be singled out as countries with rising debt ratios over the past year.

Unfortunately, this positive effect from financial repression may not persist for all. Continued winners in 2023 include the UK, the U.S. and the Euro area, all of which continue with negative interest rates while pretending to execute tight monetary policies. However, countries like Brazil now have very high real interest rates and are seeing renewed increases in debt ratios.

Brazil’s debt ratios increased in the 4th quarter of 2022 and will surge through 2023 unless the Central Bank  changes its current ultra-orthodox posture, repeating the policy mistake of the 2015-2019 period when high real rates led to a ramp up of debt levels, as shown below.

A New Path for Industrial Policy in Brazil

In recent decades, very few developing countries have reduced the income gap with rich nations, and those that have are either in East Asia or Eastern Europe. The successful “climbers” have prospered by integrating themselves into an increasingly globalized economy, gradually increasing the volumes and complexity of their exports. The “laggards” across the developing world have typically suffered from economic and political instability and shunned the competition of global markets. Brazil, the “poster child” for the laggards, has been stuck in a “middle-income trap” for over thirty years, caused by public policy errors resulting from political dynamics.

Since the 1980s “lost decade” Brazil’s politicians have pursued “distributional politics” aimed at correcting wealth disparities between regions and social classes. The previous model (like China’s current model), which for three decades (1950-1980) had been aimed at building mass production manufacturing and infrastructure, was largely discarded as inefficient and costly.

The new development model for Brazil, still very much extant today, has been driven by the “Welfare” Constitution of 1988 that imposed an extreme form of federalism which gives scarcely populated states enormously disproportionate representation in both chambers of Congress.

Unlike the successful economies of Asia and Easter Europe, since the 1980s Brazil’s industrial policy has been inward looking and aimed directly at achieving social objectives instead of economic results. The main goal of industrial policy has been to relocate industrial activity from rich states to poor states by providing abundant tax incentives to investors. The result has been the hugely wasteful Manaus Economic Free Zone and some uneconomic and nonproductive relocation of manufacturing facilities from the south to the north. Consequently, since 1980, Brazil has gone from being the prominent industrial nation in the developing world to a minor player undergoing large-scale deindustrialization.

The major winner from federal political dynamics has been the farm sector which is broadly diffused geographically in states with low population density. In this case the policies have led to massive increases in output and productivity.

In essence, Brazil’s farm sector is a disguised “Asian Tiger.”  Like in Asia, government support for Brazil’s farmers has been broad and extensive and consistent for decades. In addition to substantial fiscal, credit and export subsidies, the sector has benefitted greatly from the work of the national Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), which is widely recognized as a global leader in tropical agriculture research and has been instrumental in boosting crop productivity. Furthermore, the farm sector benefits from two more characteristics integral to the “East-Asian” development model. First, domestic competition is acute, therefore, even though state support is available to all, only the most productive farmers can thrive.  Second, because agricultural commodity markets are global in nature, the sector is export driven. This means that Brazilian farmers compete with American farmers and must remain at the forefront of technological innovation.

Unfortunately, the farm sector is not a good substitute for industry. In contrast to the job creation, work training and other multiplier effects that are integral to Asian industrial policy, the farm sector in Brazil is highly capital and technology intensive and does not generate many jobs or ancillary economic activity. Also, its success has significantly increased the commodity dependence of the Brazilian economy and led to a structural appreciation of the Brazilian real. Finally, this commodity dependence generates economic and currency instability which further undermines the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector.

The challenge for Brazil is to find new growth sectors which can secure sustainable political support and lead to productive investments that generate quality jobs. The markets are very skeptical that this can be done.

A brief effort at industrial policy during the first Lula Administration collapsed under mismanagement and corruption and was followed by an equally brief romance with neoliberal policies under Bolsonaro.

Lula’s return to power this year has revived talk of industrial policy in Brazil, abetted by a shift away from neoliberalism in the United States and China’s aggressive state-led push to achieve industrial self-sufficiency in all “strategic” industries. Unsurprisingly, given Lula’s track record, market skepticism is high. Initial signs from the new government do not give much hope. The best that the new administration has come up with so far is a hare-brained scheme to provide temporary subsidies for purchases of automobiles.

Any viable industrial policy will need broad and sustainable political support in Congress. This means that the benefits must be broadly distributed geographically. Unfortunately, Lula’s atavistic vision of development is rooted in the state-led, capital-intensive model of the 1970s (e.g. Petrobras leading investments in refining and infrastructure).

A better approach would be to focus on strategies that have been successful in other countries: tourism and “green” energy, for example. Building a national consensus with political support to provide long-term  incentives for private businesses to invest in tourism and alternative energy could set Brazil on a new growth path. Policies should be structured so that  investors face both domestic and foreign competition to weed out the weaker players.

These are two sectors that are labor intensive and with potential for broad geographical dispersion of benefits. Brazil’s woefully underdeveloped tourism industry can learn from countries like Mexico and the Dominican Republic. In the case of alternative energy, the policies pursued by the Biden Administration in the U.S., the roll out of wind and solar capacity in Texas and initiatives pursued in many other countries can be copied. The roll out of wind and solar energy in Texas is highly relevant, as Brazil has outstanding conditions  to do this, with many locations in poor states. 150,000 well-paid clean energy jobs have been created in Texas over the past eight years and the sector is growing fast.

Mexico’s Bull Run

Despite the antics, the atavistic fondness for state intervention and control, and the frequent attacks on both local and foreign business interests, Mexico’s populist leader Andres Manuel Lopes Obrador (AMLO) is presiding over the country’s best financial markets  in years.

AMLO can be credited for a sound fiscal policy and for letting the orthodox  Central Bank  do its job. This hasn’t resulted in better economic growth but it has allowed for a more stable economy than most of Mexico’s peers around emerging markets. However, the main cause for market enthusiasm seems to be the hope that Mexico will be a major beneficiary of  “friend-shoring” investments, as global manufacturers look for ways to diversify away from China.

The performance of Mexican assets has been remarkable. As shown below, the Mexican peso is the strongest currency in the world for the past one and three years,  periods marked by considerable chaos in currency markets in many other emerging markets

The Mexican stock market also has done exceptionally well, as shown in the chart below. The Bolsa is a top performer for both the past one and three years. For the past five years it is near the top, surpassed mainly by tech-heavy markets (U.S., Taiwan,  Netherlands, Denmark). This is impressive given that Mexico does not have a tech sector.

The current sectorial composition of the Mexican market relative to other markets is shown below.  A characteristic of the Mexican market is the high weight of defensive stocks, mainly consumer oriented telecom, food and retailing businesses. Unlike in most other emerging markets, the Bolsa is not dominated by state companies or mature cyclicals, but rather by well managed private concerns. The combination of a stable economy and well-managed private companies is a rarity in emerging markets.

The ten largest stocks in the MSCI Mexico index are listed below. With the possible exceptions of Banorte and Cemex, these are profitable world class companies with dominant market positions, all trading at near all-time high stock prices.

After this impressive bull run, what are the prospects for the Mexican market?

It should be noted that both the currency and stock prices started this run at low levels in both relative and absolute terms. As the chart below shows, Mexico’s Real Effective Exchange Rate was at historically low levels in 2019, and it remains competitive today. Over the past 20 years the peso has been managed like an Asian currency, for stability and export competitiveness. The Brazilian REER,  shown for contrast, is much more volatile, which causes havoc for managing the current account and promoting manufacturing exports.

 

The next chart shows that the cyclically-adjusted price earnings ratio (CAPE)  for Mexico was at historically low levels in 2019, and the PE ratio was well below trend. The CAPE ratio has now normalized but is still far from stretched.

Mexico’s CAPE ratio based on expected earnings for 2023 is currently at 17.2 which is in line with the country’s average for the past three decades. As shown below, based on historical returns, prospects for future seven- and ten-year returns are moderately positive.

 

Bull runs are not usually stopped by valuation concerns. Along with India, Mexico may continue to be one of the few large emerging market with a credible narrative and the capacity to absorb foreign capital. Nevertheless, in coming years, investors will need to see “Friend-shoring” capital flows go from hope to reality to sustain the Mexico story.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Will China’s Economic “Miracle” End in Tears?

During my freshman year in college in 1976, I took a class on development of the “Third World” which highlighted Brazil’s “economic miracle” and its rise as a leading economic power. That same year, the renowned MIT economic historian Charles Kindleberger, mulling over what country might assume global leadership from a waning United States, suggested Germany, Japan “or some country of energy and wealth, like Brazil, which has yet to make its presence felt on the world scene.”

By the early 1980s, Japan was considered by many to be the most dynamic economy in the world and on the way to surpassing the U.S.  This “miracle” economy was accompanied by a huge asset bubble, with real estate prices in Tokyo peaking in 1989 at 300 times the level of equivalent space in Manhattan.

China, the latest “economic miracle,” is now expected to become the largest economy in the world by the middle of this decade. The debates of the 1970s on global leadership have resurfaced, as the U.S.  shows signs of fatigue from shouldering the burdens of a benevolent hegemon, and China aims to reshape the world economic order into something new.

However, history shows us that economic “miracles” end in excesses of debt and speculation, and are followed by long periods of stagnation.  The Brazilian and Japanese booms are distant memories, and these economies have struggled to work out the large imbalances built up during the good years.  China’s rise also came with massive debt accumulation and an enormous real estate bubble, and it too faces a difficult transition.

At least, this is the view of the Beijing-based economist Michael Pettis, a Professor at Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management, and a keen observer of China’s developmental challenges. Pettis argues that China’s economic miracle peaked many years ago, and the drivers of growth – labor growth, investment, and exports – are now all severely constrained. Given its level of development and these constraints, Pettis argues, China now should promote consumption to sustain growth, but this path is blocked by vested interests (the beneficiaries of the previous model: provincial governments, exporters, business elites). Pettis sees a clear parallel with what has happened in Brazil and Japan, where reactionary political, business, and financial elites blocked the reforms necessary to secure sustained economic expansion.

The imbalances of China are well known and long dated. Early in 2007, Wen Jiabao (溫家寶), premier of China at the time, declared that the country’s economic growth trajectory was “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable.” Since Wen Jiabao expressed his concern, China’s debt to GDP ratio has doubled, and the real estate sector’s share of GDP grew by 50% to unprecedented heights. We can see the rise in debt levels in the chart below from the Bank for International Settlements. Given that most economist believe that China’s GDP is overstated by at least 20%, actual debt ratios may be considerably higher.

The following chart from  Rogoff and Yang (2020) shows the disproportionate share of China’s GDP related to real estate, surpassing greatly the levels reached in other countries affected by real estate bubbles.

The Chinese “economic miracle,” Pettis argues, petered out over a decade ago as productivity growth and returns on investment collapsed. GDP growth has slowed sharply, and the quality of that growth is dubious, as it comes increasingly from unproductive investments related to infrastructure and real estate. We can see this in the three charts below. The first shows the path of GDP growth, both based on official data and on the basis of an alternative methodology which aims to align China’s numbers with those of other countries. The second and third chart  show the composition of that growth for both GDP data sets. Over the past ten years, GDP growth has been cut by more than half, from the low teens to below 5%.  Meanwhile, the quality of the growth has deteriorated dramatically, coming now primarily from investment capital instead of labor growth and productivity. We can see this deterioration more starkly in the alternative data. This data comes from The Conference Board and has been developed in a partnership with the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (University of Groningen, The Netherlands) (Link).

China’s over-dependence on capital investment is in line with the experience of other Asian “tiger” economies, as described by Paul Krugman in his 1994 article “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle.” Both the Brazilian “miracle” of the 1960s and 1970s and the Japanese “miracle” of the 1980s followed a similar pattern of investment-led growth hitting a wall when returns on capital declined and debt levels reached high levels.

The Brazilian Miracle

 Brazil experienced very high growth from the 1950s to the end of the 1970s. Much of the growth in the 1950s was driven by multinational firms bringing mass production manufacturing to the country, in a process very similar to what China went through in the 1990s and 2000s. Mature technologies and business models were easily assimilated and had the advantage of being highly labor intensive. In the 1960s, more FDI came to meet Brazil’s growing consumer market, and “Asian-like” public policies were introduced to promote domestic savings and investment. During the 1970s, Brazil, benefited from a commodity boom but debt levels rose sharply (especially external debt), and investment quality and returns plummeted (increasingly pharaonic projects, roads to nowhere, as in China). The boom came to an end in 1980, and since then Brazil has stagnated, achieving growth of GDP 2.1% per year and GDP per capita growth of 0.8% annually. The mass production paradigm that benefitted Brazil so much in the 1960s and 1970s was exhausted by 1980. Since then, Brazil has been unable to grow its consumer market, leading MNCs to focus on better opportunities elsewhere (Asia, Mexico). Brazil became the poster-child for the “middle-income trap” – a middle-income economy unable to build the institutions required to sustain growth.

The first chart shows the path of GDP growth, and the second shows the enormous debt accumulation and fiscal deficits towards the end of the “miracle” in the 1970s. The third chart shows the composition of growth from 1952-2023. Remarkably, total factor productivity declined from 1.6% annually between 1952 and 1979) to negative 0.9% annually from 1980 to 2023. TFP declined sharply in the second half of the 1970s as investment-led growth lost traction.  Since 1980, Brazil has deindustrialized dramatically, and today the economy has returned to the commodity-dependence levels experienced before the industrialization process took off in the early 1950s.

Japan’s “Economic Miracle”

Japan enjoyed very high GDP growth during the 1950s and 1960s. This growth was briefly interrupted by the 1973 oil crisis, but then resumed in the second half of the 1970s and into the 1980s. This later phase of growth was characterized by real estate and stock market speculative bubbles. The asset bubble popped in 1989, and since then annual GDP growth has averaged 0.9%.

The chart below shows the contribution of labor, capital, and total factor productivity to Japan’s GDP growth. We can see broad contributions from all these factors from the 1950s until 1989, with a sharp increase of reliance on capital in the 1980s. As in Brazil in the 1970s and China over the past decade, declining returns on capital during the 1980s asset speculative boom marked the end of the Japanese miracle. From 1951 to 1989 TFP contributed 2.4% to annual GDP growth, but from 1990 until 2023, this contribution has been -0.9% annually.

 

Conclusion

Unfortunately, “economic miracles” are more chimerical than miraculous. This is most true in the last phase of the boom when excesses and speculation generate mainly malinvestment.

The post-boom periods tend to be painful and drawn-out because the beneficiaries of the past resist the reforms necessary to achieve a rapid transition to a more sustainable growth model. The U.S came out of the Great Recession of the 1930s because radical “anti-elite” measures implemented by President Roosevelt became consensual in the post-war boom. Brazil’s political and financial elites have resisted the reforms needed to improve income distribution and create a broader consumer market. The political process in Japan also has failed to change the investment and export-focused economic model. China appears to be following Japan’s example, as it continues to focus on the exhausted drivers of past growth instead of actively pushing for policies that would build the purchasing power of households in a consumption-driven economy.

Growth and Economic Complexity

Rich countries have complex economies, and poor countries get richer by increasing the technological content of what they produce. This requires many things, such as good institutions (e.g., law and order, property rights) as well as an educated population and research institutions that drive innovation. The Atlas of Economic Complexity (AEC) , a joint project of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, provides  insight into the progress countries around the world are making towards increasing their innovative capacity by measuring the degree of complexity and diversity of what they produce for global markets.

The work of the AEC was summarized in the 2011 book The Atlas Of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths To Prosperity,  by Ricardo Haussman and Cesar Hidalgo, and it is  periodically updated by the Harvard Growth Lab (link) and the Observatory of Economic Complexity (link). The AEC solves the complex problem of measuring technological advancement by focusing on the degree of complexity and the diversity of a country’s exports and comparing this over time and with trading partners.

The chart below uses the AEI data to compare the top 25 most “complex” economies of 1995 to those of 2021. Not surprisingly, the leaders  of the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) are mainly the highest income countries. But this is less true in 2020 when compared to 1998, as Asian and Eastern European middle-income countries are moving up the ranking.

 

Although the list is relatively stable, there are five changes: five entrants, China, Malaysia, Mexico,  Taiwan and Romania,  replacing  Canada, Norway, Spain, Netherlands and Brazil.

All of the new entrants are countries well integrated into regional or global trade value chains that import almost all their commodity needs, while three of the departees (Canada, Brazil, Norway) are commodity producers.  This is interesting because the period saw the commodity super-cycle (2002-2012),  which greatly boosted the incomes and exports of commodity producers. The drop in the rankings of these countries is evidence of the “commodity curse” at work, whereby commodity boom-to-bust cycles create economic turbulence with long-term debilitating effects. In 2020 there are no commodity producers in this top 25 group, unless one counts the United States, which, in any case, saw its ranking fall from 9th to 13th.

The significant deterioration suffered by commodity producing countries is shown in detail below. These include the highly financialized Anglo-Saxon economies (Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States); and the traditional emerging market commodity exporters (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Indonesia and South Africa). Brazil shares some of the characteristics of the Anglo Saxons, as it is also a highly financialized economy suffering rapid deindustrialization.

The change in the rankings from 1995 to 2020 for commodity producers is shown below. Indonesia is the only commodity exporter with an improved ranking, no doubt because it has been influenced by the mercantilist policies followed by its neighbors in South East Asia.

The contrast with the manufacturing-export-focused economies of Asia and Eastern Europe is shown below. These are all countries that have benefited from free trade and regional integration policies.

 

Finally, the following chart highlights the different paths taken by Brazil, Mexico and Turkey. Brazil has deindustrialized dramatically since 1995 and further  increased its dependence on commodities. Moreover, it has rejected globalization and regional integration.  On the other hand, Mexico and Turkey have embraced regional integration and successfully found their place in global value chains.

 

 

The Return of Deflation Raises Caution in Emerging Markets

All signs point to an imminent recession in the U.S. and the return of deflationary forces. The markets are pricing this in, forecasting that the Fed will begin to cut interest rates this summer. The debate is now between the soft-landing and hard-landing camps and on the length of the coming downturn, and on whether Jeremy Powel has the stomach for austerity or whether he will happily return to ZIRP and money printing.

In this environment, safety will trump risk. The recent surge in the infallible FAANG stocks — the current preferred safe haven for global investors — and the poor returns for value, small cap and cyclical stocks shows that we are in the very late stage of the business cycle or already in recession. Emerging market assets are not likely to do well at this time.

Commodity prices are leading the way in this deflationary push. As the chart below shows, oil and lumber, which are the two most significant economic indicators in the U.S. are down sharply relative to inflation (CPI). Oil is down 37% over the past year and natural gas is down 74%.  Lumber prices have fallen 50% more than the CPI. Even copper, which is supported by tight supplies and rising demand from “climate change” policies, is  still down 13% and supporting the deflationary push.

 

We also see broad deflationary forces in the broad commodity indices. forces. The S&P GSCI Commodity Index (GTX) and the S&P GSCI Industrial Metals Index are down 18% and 15%, respectively, over the past year, while the CPI has risen 6%.

The Industrial metals index is most significant for emerging markets because historically it has led the way for EM stocks. We can see this below.

Investors should keep their powder dry for the beginning of a new cycle in 2024.

Brazil’s Grievous Manufacturing Collapse

Brazil has become a posterchild for the Middle-Income Trap which hinders countries  no longer able to compete against low-wage countries but without the productivity growth to compete in the higher value added industries dominated by advanced economies. But little attention has been given to the related  economic phenomenon which strikes commodity producers – “Dutch Disease,” also known as the Natural Resource Curse. The combination of the two for Brazil  has caused crippling premature deindustrialization.

Brazil has suffered two severe bouts of “Dutch Disease.” The first during the commodity boom of the 1970s which was followed by the bust of the 1980s and a “lost decade” of economic stagnation. The second, during the 2001-2012 commodity super-cycle  driven by China’s “economic miracle, which was also followed by a long economic depression. These two commodity booms were marked by similar excesses — overvalued currencies, unsustainable consumer booms, excess fiscal spending and high levels of debt accumulation, a deterioration of governance and a rise in corruption. In their wakes, the booms left behind a debilitated manufacturing sector, high debt levels and lower growth prospects.

 

 

Brazil’s “Dutch Disease” has been worsened by the concurrent strong growth of the farming, mining and oil sectors — all productive and  capital intensive activities with a high degree of export competitiveness. The rapid growth of these sectors, and the discovery of the giant offshore pre-salt oil fields,  has strengthened the current account and caused a structural appreciation of the Brazilian real. The loss of competitiveness of Brazil’s manufacturing sector has been more than compensated by the increased production and dollar revenues of the growth sectors. Unfortunately, these successful sectors generate scarce jobs and lack the significant multiplier effects of the manufacturing sector.

The chart below shows manufacturing GDP as a percentage of GDP for both resource rich and resource poor countries in emerging markets. The declining trend for commodity exporters relative to commodity importers is notable, and Brazil stands out in particular.

 

In 1980, at the end of the 1970s commodity boom, Brazil was the dominant manufacturing power in emerging markets  (China surpassed Brazil’s production levels but was behind in terms of complexity and quality of manufacturing). The following chart from the World Bank shows manufacturing value added for the primary emerging markets (and France for comparative purposes) both for 1980 and 2021. The rise of China and the relative decline of Brazil are striking.

The same data is shown below with Brazil as the benchmark, to measure relative performance.  Over this period, China’s manufacturing value added went from two times Brazil’s to 31.3x, a relative increase of  15.7x. India went from 44% of Brazil’s level to 2.9x. Every single country in the chart has gained relative to Brazil. This includes commodity producers (highlighted in red) which also may have suffered Dutch Disease. Most striking are Indonesia and Malaysia which went from 15% of Brazil to 150%, and 8% to 56%, respectively, a testament to the Asian commitment to currency stability and manufacturing exports.

 

 

Finally, the following chart shows the decline in industrial employment in Brazil over the past decade. In 2019, according to World Bank data, only 20% of employment in Brazil was in industry, a decline from 23.4% in  1991. This places Brazil at a level similar to advanced rich countries with service-intensive economies. In Brazil these service jobs tend to be poorly paid and unproductive with very few opportunities for training and advancement.

Brazil’s manufacturing collapse has no easy solution. Brazil’s successful commodity exporters yield extensive political power, not the least with the oversized financial sector. Schemes like those adopted by Argentina, featuring  multi-tiered currencies and taxes on exporters are difficult to implement and have high costs. A return to high tariffs on imports would be highly unpopular. A mix of these policies is likely to be introduced by the new administration with elevated short-term costs and unclear long=term benefits.

The Big Mac, Neo-mercantilists and the Commodity Curse

As the world moves away from the globalization of manufacturing value chains and finance, the protection of domestic markets is back in favor with policy makers. However, the new mercantilists will have to overcome high costs, including overvalued currencies.

The case of TSMC’s investment in a new $40 BB semiconductor  plant is illustrative. The Taiwanese chipmaker gave in to pressure from the Biden Administration  and agreed to build a “fab’ in Arizona, but it does not seem to be happy about it. Recent press reports say the Taiwanese chipmaker’s management is dismayed by “exorbitant costs and unmanageable workers.”

TSMC’s preference for manufacturing at home is not surprising. Taiwan is a model of successful mercantilist policies (repression of wages, directed credit and competitive currency) that create a haven for manufacturing exports. Taiwan, and other Asian “tigers”, have carefully managed their currencies to assure export competitiveness. The U.S., on the other hand, has long favored consumers over manufacturers, and has an overvalued currency, which serves as the safe haven asset for the rest of the world.

We can see the challenges faced by the new mercantilists by looking at relative exchange rates. Below, we shows the Big Mac Index rankings and Real Effective Exchange rates. The Economist’s Big Mac index is a good measure of the overall cost for  businesses to operate in an economy, as the product being compared incorporates farm, manufacturing, and services, including taxes and regulations. Countries with an established vocation for manufacturing exports are labeled in green, while commodity producers that rely more on imports are labeled in bold black. The chart compares three data points — today, 2020 pre-covid and 2010. We can see that across these periods exporters have cheap Big Macs and importers have expensive Big Macs. There are some exceptions for importers, explained by excessive political instability and capital flight (South Africa, Argentina in 2010, Peru and Brazil in 2023).

Brazil and the United States, two countries now enthusiastically pursuing neo-mercantilist agendas, are interesting and similar cases. They both are  countries that have severely deindustrialized, while at the same time expanding energy production aggressively. Both went from large importers of oil to self-sufficient since 2010, which, all else being equal, means  stronger currencies. The implication is that neo-mercantilist policies will be pursued at a high cost, without the luxury of a weak currency.

Real Effective Exchange Rates (REER) tell the same story. The exporters are all close or below long-term averages, with Thailand the possible exception. Vietnam is an interesting case of an aspiring Asian “Tiger” that may be undermined by an appreciating currency, the result of diplomatic pressure from the U.S.

The irony is that commodity prices are likely to remain high in the 2020s because of a more inflationary environment and production bottlenecks. This would mean stronger currencies for commodity producers and even higher costs to implement reindustrialization policies. The “commodity curse” is difficult to shed.

Brazil and the Return of Neomercantilism

The principal challenge of emerging markets policy makers is to provide the business environment for private enterprise to invest in activities that generate sustainable and equitable growth.

When they fail to do this they face the crippling flight of both financial and human capital. The ease  of communications, travel and capital movements make it easier than ever for wealthy and cosmopolitan elites to move their families and capital abroad.

Human and financial  capital drain can be devastating for emerging markets. Some 4.5 million Indians,  generally well-educated, have immigrated to the U.S. and the U.K. since 1980, contributing greatly to these developed economies. Venezuela has lost most of its educated elite and middle class over the past 15 years, leaving the country with dire prospects of ever recovering the middle-income status it once enjoyed. The past decade of slow growth and political unrest in Latin America has caused massive  capital flight from historically more stable countries like Brazil and Chile.

Brazil, which in the past largely avoided the drain of human and financial capital, now faces an exodus, with Portugal and the U.S. as the favorite destinations. With the return to power of the leftist Lula — reenergized, more bitter and radical after his two-year prison confinement — this flight from Brazil is sure to accelerate.

Ironically, the policies proposed by Lula are no longer on the ideological extreme. On the contrary, the new government’s policy proposals – government support through subsidies and credit for industrial onshoring and green technologies, all justified under the banner of national security and sovereignty – are a carbon copy of those promoted by the Biden Administration in the U.S. Moreover, the quote below, which was made this week by President Biden, could have come out of Lula’s mouth

“What it’s about is giving working folks a chance. I’ve never been a big fan of trickledown economics. In the family I was raised in not a lot trickled down to our table. When the middle-class does well, everybody does well. I campaigned on build from the bottom and middle out and when that happens the poor have a chance up, the middle class does well, and the wealthy always do well.”

In many ways, Biden’s quote applies even more to Brazil than it does to the U.S., as Brazil’s has suffered more deindustrialization than the U.S., and its inequality is one of the worst in the world and worsening.

Brazil desperately needs a new policy framework which promotes investment in productive activities with jobs that provide a middle-class lifestyle, not the service jobs (e.g. food delivery) that have been the only source of jobs in recent years. Or else, it will continue deeper into a peripheral role as a  supplier of commodities, mainly to China. The core of any economic strategy has to be to improve the income of the mass of Brazilians that currently barely participate in the productive economy.

According to the World Inequality Database, the poorest 50% of Brazil’s populations have about 8% of the country’s income and none of its wealth.  The consequence of this is that Brazil is really two countries: one country of some 20 million people  who have the income level of southern Europeans and are genuine consumers; and another country of 200 million people – including  a large poor segment relying extensively on government handouts – that has little purchasing power. The charts below compares Brazil to other countries in this regard. With a little over 20% of its population able to consume, Brazil’s consumer market is small. Worse, it hasn’t grown much over the past twenty years, increasing only during commodity booms.

Given the size of its available market, Brazil does not underproduce. For example, production of motor vehicles per potential consumer is comparable to other countries. Given current circumstances opportunities for capturing foreign demand are scarce, so the only opportunity for growth would come from an increase in the population of consumers.

Brazil’s new government understands Brazil’s challenges and has ambitious plans to relaunch the economy through an active promoter-state. Unfortunately, it maintains its traditional penchant for doing this through state companies and a big-state mentality.

However, Lula’s main problem is that his Labor Party lacks credibility. Lula pretends that the rampant corruption and incompetent management of the last PT government (2002-2016) never happened, but for most Brazilians the memory of that period is still vivid. No one has forgotten that the previous PT government’s (2002-2016) efforts to implement similar policies were crippled by graft and poor execution, and expectations are high that the same will occur again.

The tragedy of Brazil is that it is likely to miss the boat again. It was a major loser of the past 40 years of neoliberalism and globalization (starting the process at its end with Finance Minister Paulo Guedes) and now, as the world turns to neomercantilism, it is unprepared to respond adequately.

 

 

 

 

 

China’s Existential Threat to Emerging Market Economies

The model of development followed by most developing countries has been to gradually move up the value chain of manufactured goods while at the same time establishing control of the production of the basic inputs of industrialization which are steel, cement, ammonia, and plastics.

This model of development worked well for many of the current middle income emerging market countries. Brazil and Mexico, for example, developed its steel, cement, ammonia and petrochemical industries in the 1950s and 1960s while it concurrently dominated the process of mass production of motor vehicles, capital goods and many other basic consumer goods. Those years were the golden years for these countries and were broadly perceived as economic “miracles.” Most middle-income Asian countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia) repeated this process in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s with similar success, now followed by Vietnam.

This process of basic industrialization was achieved with foreign investment and the transfer of mature technologies from the U.S. and other developed countries. The technologies were easy to transplant to developing countries and had the advantage of being scalable to different markets and often  large generators of low-skill “quality” jobs. Generations of Brazilians were integrated into the modern economy and learned the skills of industrialization and the routines of modern enterprises by working in manufacturing, and they entered into the middle class and became consumers (e.g., Brazil’s current president, Lula, worked in an auto plant in Sao Paulo in the 1960s as a metalworker before becoming a union leader).

Two things happened to dramatically undermine this trend. First, the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s spawned the “Washington Consensus” for free trade and capital movements and the great wave of hyper-globalization of the past decades. Second, in the 1980s,  China entered the phase of rapid development, following the path set by Brazil and others: exploiting foreign investment and technology transfer to dominate the production of the basic inputs of industry (steel, cement, ammonia and plastics) and the mass production of consumer and capital goods.

While the mass production technological cycle (“Fordism”) was exhausting itself in both the industrialized world and middle-income emerging markets, giving way to the Information and Communication Technology revolution (ICT), China gave it new life. With abundant cheap labor and clever incentives, China became the dominant global producer of most basic industrial goods,  replacing production capacity in both developed and developing markets. In a neoliberal era of free markets, multinationals gladly offshored the mature mass production function to China, to gain access to cheap labor, subsidies and lax environmental rules. The combination of a large and growing domestic market and access to international markets gave China a scale advantage which previous fast-growing developing countries had never enjoyed during this period of learning to dominate the mass production process.

The degree to which China has taken over the mass production paradigm is shown in the following charts: 1. Global Primary Energy Consumption; 2. Global steel production; 3. Global cement production; 4. Global ammonia production; 5. Global plastics production. The growth of output that China has experienced in all of these areas is astonishing in a historical context. China consumed one third the primary energy consumed by the U.S. in 1980 and 1.7 times as much in 2021; it produced about the same amount of steel as the U.S. in 2000 and now produces 10 times more; China’s cement output in 2020 was 27 times the U.S.’s peak production year; China produced 2.5 times more ammonia than the U.S. did in 2021; and China now produces 1.5 times the plastics made by the U.S.

 

As China moves up the manufacturing value chains, it now seeks to dominate global markets for consumer durables, such as computers, televisions and cars. The charts below show the astronomical growth of China’s car production and its recent progress in tapping export markets. China’s growth in auto production over the past decade is greater than the entire growth of the industry on a global basis. And now, China’s auto firms, as the economist Brad Setser recently noted, are ramping up exports. In a few years’ time, Chinese passenger car exports have grown to surpass those of the U.S. and Korea and match those of Germany. Most of these highly subsidized exports are finding their way to developing countries.

The extension of the mass production technology cycle was an unequivocal boon for China but a mixed blessing for developed countries and the middle-income emerging markets. In exchange for cheap consumer goods and high corporate profits, manufacturing sectors were decimated, jobs were lost and income inequality and political rage increased. Moreover, while the mass production cycle was extended, with dire consequences for CO2 emissions, the potential benefits of the ICT revolution were delayed. Instead of focusing on making industry more productive and greener, Silicon Valley has channeled most of ICT investments into social networking, search, delivery and gaming applications.

For developing markets, China’s rise is an existential threat. Unless they can defend themselves with tariffs, they are condemned to handing over their consumer demand for manufactured goods to China in exchange for commodities.

Emerging Markets’ no Growth Decade

Emerging market stocks have performed poorly for more than a decade both in relative and absolute terms. This can be explained by a marked decline in price to earnings multiples since the very high levels achieved in 2008 and 2012 combined with poor growth in these earnings. In turn, low growth in earnings were caused by a significant deterioration in the GDP growth of most emerging markets.

We show the evolution of multiples and earnings in the following charts.  CAPE multiples are at a third of the level reached in 2008 while earnings have been flat in nominal USD terms.

 

This remarkable result can be explained by the unbalanced growth of the global economy. While emerging markets are said to be growing GDP at a higher rate than developed markets, the growth is highly concentrated in China (and to a degree India). Emerging markets ex China and India have languished over this period. We show this in the chart below.

 

Given the disappointing growth of emerging markets ex China since the GFC,  it is not surprising that earnings growth has been poor. What is stunning is the lack of earnings growth in both China and India, despite their high GDP growth, as shown below.

The explanation lies in the unbalanced nature of Chinese growth, which relies on the repression of the consumer to subsidize the export sector and unproductive state investments in infrastructure and industry. China’s excess capacity is increasingly dumped on emerging markets, leading to deindustrialization, low productivity and low growth.

Using CAPE Ratios in Emerging Markets

 

The CAPE methodology is well suited for volatile and cyclical markets such as those we find in Emerging Markets. Countries in the EM asset class are prone to boom-to-bust economic cycles which are accompanied by large liquidity inflows and outflows that have significant impact on asset prices. These cycles often lead to periods of extreme valuations both on the expensive and cheap side. The Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings multiple (CAPE) has proven effective in highlighting them.

The CAPE takes the average of inflation-adjusted earnings for the past ten years, which serves to smooth out the cyclicality of earnings.  We use dollarized data so that currency trends are fully captured. This methodology has been used by investors for ages and has been popularized recently by professor Robert Shiller of Yale University.

CAPE is best used as a long-term allocation tool. However, it is not effective  as  a timing tool. Market timers seeking short-term returns will be more successful using traditional technical analysis to identify trends and paying close attention to investor sentiment and liquidity flows.

CAPE works particularly well in markets with highly cyclical economies subject to volatile trade and currency flows (Latin America, Turkey, Indonesia);  it works less well for more stable economies (e.g., East Asia).

In recent years CAPE has  has been ineffective in predicting forward annual returns. This has occurred because momentum has been more important in determining stock performance than valuation indicators. Moreover, emerging markets started the past decade at very high valuations, and only recently have come to trade at cheap levels and, in some cases, extremely low valuations.

Since  October 2020, we have seen a marked change in the investment environment, with the value factor in both U.S. and international stocks starting to outperform “growth” stocks. Emerging market value stocks have outperformed the EM index by over 20% during 2021-2022. Also, by and large, “cheap” CAPE stocks have started to reward investors. The cheapest stocks on a CAPE basis at the end of 2021 (Turkey, Chile and Brazil) all performed exceptionally well in 2022.

In the charts below we see  what CAPE ratios are currently telling us about future returns based on historical precedents. We map index returns and CAPE ratios for the U.S., GEM (Global Emerging Markets) and the most important emerging market countries (China, India, Taiwan, Korea and Brazil) and also for several countries of interest (Turkey, Philippines and Mexico). The data covers the period since 1987 when the MSCI EM index was launched. The charts show a clear linear relationship between CAPE and returns with particular significance at extreme valuations. Country specific data is more significant because the CAPE ratios capture better the evolution of the single asset.

  1. S&P 500 :  The market has not provided 10-year annualized returns above ten percent when CAPE is above 25. Every time that the market has provided lower than 5% annualized return the CAPE has been above 30. The CAPE at year-end 2022 was at 27.3, a level which suggests moderate nominal returns in the low single digits for the next 7-10 years.

  1. Global Emerging Markets. At the current level (15.4) the GEM CAPE provides little insight. The probability of negative or high returns both appear to be low. GEM should be bought below 15 and sold above 20.

3. China’s short and turbulent stock market history provides few data points for CAPE analysis. Nevertheless, the current CAPE (9.5) has provided high returns in the past and points to low risk of negative returns. Chinese stocks should be bought below 12 and sold above 20.

 

4.India: The CAPE for India (25.6) is high both in absolute terms and relative to the country’s history, reflecting a good GDP growth profile in a world with scarce growth and investor enthusiasm. At this high level  return prospects are poor and negative returns are a distinct possibility. Indian stocks should be bought in the high teens and sold in the high twenties.

5. Brazil: At the current CAPE (9.4) history points to potentially high returns, but not without risk of disappointment. The ideal entry point for Brazil is below 8 and the market should be sold around 18.

  1. Korea: The CAPE for Korea (6.4) is low both in absolute terms and relative to the country’s history. At this CAPE level high returns are likely and negative returns are a low risk. Korean stocks should be bought below 10 and sold in the high teens.

5.Taiwan: The current CAPE for Taiwan (14.9) is cheap. Future returns appear attractive but Taiwan has a turbulent stock market history, a highly cyclical market and geopolitical risk, so caution is advised. Taiwan should be bought below 15 and sold above 20.

6.Mexico:The CAPE for Mexico (15.3) is in neutral territory, implying fair valuation. The market should be bought in the low teens and sold in the mid twenties.

7. Philippines: The current CAPE (13.1) is on the low side and offers the prospect of high returns with some risk. The market should be bought below 15 and sold above 25.

8.Turkey: The current CAPE (6.9) is low in absolute terms and relative to the country’s history and offers the prospect of high returns, made more likely by the recent momentum. Nevertheless, this is  always a very risky market with turbulent macroeconomics and politics and short cycles. This market should be bought below 10 and sold above 15.

4Q 2022 Expected Returns for Emerging Market Stocks

Emerging market stocks once again lagged U.S. stocks in 2022, as they have consistently over the past decade.  A rising dollar and persistent economic instability and risk aversion all have contributed to making emerging market stocks a poor asset class over the past year and the last decade. However, there are signs that the environment may be changing. EM stocks are now very cheap relative to the S&P 500, the dollar shows signs of having peaked and, most importantly, investors are looking for real assets that may perform better in a more inflationary environment. EM stocks, which have a high concentration of commodities and cyclical businesses , may be better positioned in the future than they have been in the “growth”-dominant investment world of the past decade.  Moreover, after a decade of poor returns, value investing (contrarian investing in cheap stocks in cyclical industries with little growth) is working again in emerging markets.

The MSCI EM value index outperformed the MSCI EM core index by 5% over the year, and, more importantly, the cheapest countries in the EM index were the best performers. This is in stark contrast to the past five years when cheap only became cheaper and rich only became richer.

The chart below shows the 2022 returns for all the countries in the MSCI EM index. On the right margin countries in the index are shown ranked in terms of a CAPE valuation based expected returns analysis at year-end 2021, with the cheapest on the top and the most expensive on the bottom. We can see that the cheapest countries (Chile, Turkey and Brazil) were the best performers in 2022 while expensive countries (India, Russia, USA, Taiwan) generally did poorly. The Philippines are one important exception to this trend, having started the year as “cheap” and ended even “cheaper.”

This trend should boost the confidence of EM investors. Emerging markets are by nature a value asset (highly weighted to cyclical businesses) and should not be performing well in an environment of rising risk aversion.  But investors are now betting that these markets are too cheap to avoid because low valuations promise high expected returns that more than compensate for short-term risks.

The chart below shows the current expected returns for EM markets and for the S&P500 based on a CAPE ratio analysis. The Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings Ratio (CAPE)  is based on the average of inflation-adjusted earnings for the past ten years, which serves to smooth out the cyclicality of earnings. This is a particularly useful tool for highly cyclical assets like EM stocks.  We use dollarized data to capture currency trends. This methodology has been used by investors for ages and has been popularized more recently by Professor Robert Shiller at Yale University.

As we have seen in recent years, CAPE is not a good timing tool, but it does tend to work well over time, particularly at extreme valuations.  CAPEs below five, such as Turkey ‘s at the end of 2021, historically have been a failsafe indicator of high future returns. CAPE ratios that are completely out of sync with historical averages for the country are also powerful predictors of future returns.

The table above points to significant opportunities in EM. Global EM (GEM) on its own is cheap relative to the U.S., but more attractive opportunities exist at the top of the chart, particularly in Colombia, Brazil Chile, Taiwan, Peru, South Africa, the Philippines, Mexico, Turkey and Korea, which all promise high returns. Moreover, these countries offer significant, geographical, geopolitical and business cycle diversification opportunities. Colombia, Chile, Philippines and Korea are all extremely cheap relative to their valuation history and are well positioned for business cycle recovery in 2023. On the other hand, India , the most popular market with investors today, is an absolute outlier on the expensive side.

That cheap markets are now performing well in a risky environment is very encouraging for EM investors. If value continues to do well, EM stocks will likely do very well when the coming synchronized global and U.S. recessions hit bottom.

A Simple Allocation Strategy for Including EM Stocks in Global Portfolios

After a brutal decade for emerging markets stocks marked by poor absolute returns and dismal performance relative to the S&P 500, it is timely to review how the asset class fits into a global allocation process.

Any investor in emerging market bonds or stocks, unless he or she is a dedicated portfolio manager with a mandate to outperform an EM index on a short term basis (1-3years), should operate under the following assumptions.

1.“Buy-and-hold” does not work in EM.

2. Risk always trumps valuation in EM stocks and bonds.

3. EM stocks are liquidity-driven trending assets.

4. The U.S. dollar drives returns and is negatively correlated to EM stocks and bonds.

The first premise – “Buy-and-hold” does not work in EM – is derived from the other premises. Emerging markets are too subject to “sudden stops” of liquidity to provide reliable returns for investors over meaningful periods, say over a decade. Empirical evidence clearly guides investors to avoid “sudden stops” by focusing more on risk than on valuation. Risky market conditions, measured by macro vulnerability (debt, deficits, overvalued currencies), domestic politics and geopolitics (e.g., Russia), will almost always trump low valuations. Low valuations and low risk provide the best conditions, but you are better off owning expensive stocks in a low-risk country than cheap stocks in a risky country. Of course investors tend to do the opposite,  as we last saw in 2008-2012 when EM bulls courted disaster by buying extreme valuations at a time of extreme risk.

If buy-and-hold is a losing strategy, the question is how to time allocation exposure to EM markets. The answer lies in premise three and four. History shows us that EM assets are trending assets, and this is for good reasons. Therefore the job of the allocator is to identify the trends and ride them  until they exhaust themselves. The first chart below shows the performance of the MSCI EM stock index relative to the S&P 500  over its 35-year history. We can clearly see two periods when allocations to EM stocks paid off handsomely for investors: 1987-1994 and 2001-2012. Unfortunately, all this relative outperformance was wiped out in the past ten years. The second chart, from BOFA’s recent 2023 Market Outlook, shows the relative performance over a much longer 72-year period. Though it is problematic to come up with a realistic EM index over this period, BOFA’s data shows a third massive cycle of outperformance for EM stocks lasting from 1970-1980.

There are two fundamental causes behind these long trends: valuations and the U.S. dollar. Three of the peaks in U.S. performance (1970, 2000, 2022) are characterized by very high valuations in the U.S. (the Nifty Fifty bubble in 1970, the TMT bubble in 2000 and the Everything Bubble of 2022) and an overvalued dollar. All the periods of EM outperformance start with low relative valuations and an expensive dollar. This insight is confirmed by the DXY dollar index, shown in the next chart. Every spike in the DXY (dollar strength) is accompanied by strong relative performance of U.S. assets.

This relationship between the USD and EM stocks is further illustrated in the chart below. We can see the obvious negative correlation between EM stock prices and the DXY.

 

Another chart from the BOFA 2023 Outlook points to another fundamental correlation with important consequences for EM investing. This chart shows how growth stocks (tech and healthcare ) are negatively correlated to value/cyclical stocks (energy and financials).

This is a critical insight with important implication for EM allocation. EM stocks can be considered value stocks with a dominance of cyclical exposure in commodities and industrials.

We can see this insight confirmed by the chart below which shows the correlation between the S&P Industrial Metals Index (GSCI) and the DXY. The chart looks almost the same as the chart above that showed the relationship between EM stocks and the DXY.

 

 

As we can deduce from the following chart, EM stocks are a leveraged play on the prices of industrial metals.

This relationship leads to a further important insight for EM allocation. On both a global or a country basis, the simplest and most cost-effective manner to gain exposure to EM stocks is through commodity stocks. This is shown in the next two charts, which show first the performance of mining companies relative to the EM index and the performance of Vale relative to the Brazilian index. These stocks outperform massively on the uptrend and underperform on the downtrend.

Therefore, for a global allocator investing in emerging markets can be simplified to owning blue-chip mining firms during upcycles and unloading them when the cycle turns. However, we still have to identify the cycles. To do this the allocator must follow the trends and valuations.

A simple method to gauge the condition of the long-term trend is to look at the one-year relative performance of the S&P 500 relative to EM stocks and the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies.

The chart below shows that the S&P 500 continued to outperform EM stocks (with and without China) over the past year.

The DXY also is still in an upward trend on a 1-year, 3-year and 5-year basis, as shown below.

Valuation is also an important element in determining turning points. We know that U.S. stocks and the U.S. dollar both are very expensive relative to history. As shown below, we also can be confident that EM stocks are cheap relative to their own histories and compared to U.S. stocks.

A sign that a new trend may be forming is that value, cyclicals and the cheapest EM stocks (e.g., Turkey) all have been outperforming this year, while U.S. tech is faltering.

Latin America’s Pink Wave Faces Investor Skepticism

A pink wave of leftist governments has swept across Latin America. In recent years, first Mexico, then Argentina, Peru, Chile and Colombia and finally Brazil, have all elected governments with ambitious social agendas and plans for bringing back the state as the agent of economic development. Unfortunately for them, investors, both local and foreign, are not sticking around to see how this will work out.

The left in Latin America has a dismal record with its style of developmental activism centered around state companies, private firm “champions” and protectionism. Recent experience with Peronist Argentina, Bolivarian Venezuela and Brazil’s PT party have ended in economic collapse, inflation, currency devaluation, soaring debt and increased misery. The result has been a decade of severe capital and human flight.

The return of Lula and his PT party to power in Brazil promises more of the same big plans for state-led growth promoted by government agencies, state companies and public banks. It doesn’t matter that these policies previously ended in enormous losses caused by mismanagement and rampant corruption.

Unlike a decade ago, when Latin America’s left was going against the neoliberalism of the Washington Consensus, today state activism is back in favor in Western capitals. Partially as a response to Chinese policies but also because of a new concern for the many domestic losers of globalization, the Biden Administration has pushed through the country’s biggest-ever piece of climate legislation (The Inflation Reduction Act) which will provide lucrative tax incentives to companies that develop mines, processing facilities, battery plants and EV factories in the US. In addition, with bipartisan support, new laws have been passed to promote infrastructure and semiconductor investments. Moreover, these new programs now have strong intellectual support from academicians (Mariana Mazzucato and Carlota Perez are prominent examples) who argue that history points to the importance of government policies to induce investment, particularly at times of enormous technological disruption like the ones we are now living.

Chile’s president Gabriel Boric has sought the counsel of Carlota Perez, a Venezuelan economist who studies the interplay of long-term technology and financial cycles,  to understand how Chile fits into the current process of global technological transformation engendered by the Information and Telecommunications Technology (ICT) revolution. According to Perez, Latin America has been a major loser of this technology cycle which has crippled the mass production “Fordism” model (manufacturing jobs that pay enough for a worker to acquire middle class consumer goods) that was the foundation of the post WW II Latin American modern economy. These jobs have been destroyed across South America and replaced by low-pay/low-skills service jobs. Nevertheless, Perez actually sees a brighter future, as we have now entered the period of massive diffusion of ICT technologies, a “golden age of full deployment.” During the second half of long technology cycles, typically the productive sector replaces the financial sector as the driver of the economy. Perez sees a vital role for the state at this stage of the cycle to “tilt the playing field” through public policies (credit, taxes, subsidies, etc…) to support productive activities and “smart, green, healthy global growth.” She recommends that a country like Chile  promote  ICT diffusion by inducing investments into socially critical areas (e.g., the democratization of access to education and information) and into priority frontier industries (e.g., alternative energy technologies and supply chains).  Perez argues that those countries with political dynamics that allow for proactive public policies will  have a big advantage in coming years. Without these policies, ICT investments have primarily financed “escapist undertakings” such as computer games, social networks, parallel universes and delivery services for the rich, Perez says.

In line with the ideological shift towards state activism, Brazil’s Andre Lara Resende, a MIT trained economist who has joined president-elect Lula’s economic transition team, argues in favor of “alternative policies of public investment” to kick-start capital deployment in infrastructure, decarbonization, electrification and industrial revitalization. According to Lara Resende, these investments are productive and profitable and would  boost economic activity , and, therefore, would have a positive impact on fiscal accounts. His rationale relies on a proposed radical change in Brazil’s monetary policy from the current Fed-centric model to an independent one based on ‘’Modern Monetary Theory,” which assumes that public debt does not matter as long as rates are below nominal GDP growth.  Lara Resende would achieve this through financial repression (artificially low interest rates and directed lending), at the expense of what he sees as an over-sized financial sector divorced from the productive sector of the economy and at the service of the rentier class.

Though Lara Resende doesn’t say this, the logical consequence of his plan is a return to the strict capital controls that Brazil had until the 1990s. Of course, investors will try to anticipate this change. Boric faces the same issue in Chile which as seen huge levels of capital flight in expectation of structural changes to economic policy.

The president of Brazil’s Bradesco, Bank, Octavio de Lazari, this week warned president-elect, Lula that, given “an extremely challenging” 2023, there is no room for “tests and experiments,” and he suggested the government focus on reducing inflation and controlling fiscal deficits. From within Lula’s economic transition team, the sole orthodox member, the economist Persio Arida, echoed these thoughts, advising his colleagues to stick to the basic objectives —  ‘Opening the economy, making the state more efficient and reforming the tax system” — which have been pursued by  Brazilian economic policy makers, unsuccessfully, for the past 40 years.

Latin America faces a stark dilemma. The neoliberal polices of the Washington Consensus are deeply out of favor and blamed for currents ills, and the rich countries are moving away from these policies and are increasingly prone to fiscal and monetary experimentation and state activism. This could in theory provide an opening for policy changes in Latin America. However, investors believe that today’s Latin American states do not have the ability to implement state-led growth without the corruption and incompetence of the past. In a world of free capital flows, investors will prefer to move  their capital outside the country rather then risk it at home.

The New Global Monetary Regime

The U.S. dollar has been the lynchpin of the global monetary system since the end of World War II, promoting the geopolitical strategic interests of the United States and serving as a “public good” to facilitate the globalization of trade and finance. However, today the rise of China and growing threats to globalization present significant challenges to the long-term hegemony of the dollar. At a time when China aims to change the present dollar-centric monetary order, the dynamics of economic and domestic political forces in the U.S. also put into question its usefulness.

The weight of the dollar in global central bank reserves peaked in 2000 and has been falling gradually since then (chart 1). Today, the global economy has returned to a state of multipolarity last seen prior to WW1 when both Germany and the United States threatened the hegemony of pound sterling. In terms of its share of global GDP and trade and its status as a primary creditor to the world, China’s desire to shape a less dollar-centric global monetary system is legitimate (chart 2). China today has become the largest trading partner of most countries around the world and is the dominant importer of most commodities, so it is not surprising, given growing tensions with the U.S., that it does not want to have to rely on dollars to transact foreign trade (chart 3)

Chart 1

Chart 2, Countries share of world GDP, trade and capital exports

Chart 3, The largest trading partner of countries around the world

The current dollar fiat global monetary order also has become a burden for the U.S. economy. Since the 1950s, the U.S. has gone from being the dominant manufacturing power and exporter of the world and its primary creditor to the present day hyper-financialized and speculative economy with net debts  of $30 trillion to the world. Moreover, the political mood in America has turned against the neoliberal policies of the past decades — anchored on the free flow of trade, capital and immigration and current account deficits  — which seriously undermined American labor.

The gradual strengthening of a multipolar global monetary order will add  instability and costs and further the geopolitical deterioration and rising inflation that we have seen so far in the 2020s. A world of less trade, more of it non-dollar centric, and declining global trade imbalances will be very different from the experience of past decades. Over the short-run, the  dollar’s strength is likely to continue, driven by its safe-haven status in unstable times and the diminished supply of dollars resulting from more balanced global trade. Over the longer term, the dollar could weaken considerably from its currently overvalued levels. A decline in dollar hegemony implies a weaker dollar over time, but it is good to remember that because of powerful network effects reserve currency regimes are very sticky (e.g.,  more reserves were still held in pound sterling than in dollars until 1963).

The 75-year U.S. dollar reserve currency system has been unique in terms of its global reach, but in myriad ways it appears to be following in the steps of the previous regimes centered around the pound sterling, the Dutch florin and others before it.  These currency regimes lasted for around a century going through distinct phases:

  1. Economic, trade and creditor dominance. Expansion of productive capacity and capital accumulation.
  2. Excess capital accumulation, leading to financialization and speculation at the expense of the productive sector.
  3. Economic decline, as new powers seek hegemony.

The  current dollar reserve currency regime has followed this pattern since its launch at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.

Bretton Woods I (1945-1971)

The U.S.  imposed a dollar-centric monetary system at the Bretton Woods Conference. Disregarding the argument made by John Maynard Keynes for a global bank that would resolve current account imbalances,  all currencies  were anchored to the dollar at a fixed price for gold. The U.S. came out of the war with by far the largest economy in the world, as a huge net creditor to the world and as the dominant manufacturing and trading nation, all of which secured reserve currency status for the dollar.

In the 1950s, the U.S. ran current account surpluses with its major global trading partners, which were largely rechanneled into aid and direct investments for the reconstruction of the war-torn economies of Europe and Asia. However, by the early 1960s, Japan and Europe had recovered and were running current account surpluses with the U.S., which were registered as increases in each country’s “gold” reserves held at the U.S Federal Reserve. Growing opposition to the system was best expressed by France’s finance minister Valerie Giscard D’Estaing who decried the “exorbitant privilege” enjoyed by the U.S. (the supposed advantage of paying for imports by printing dollars). The system showed its first crack when France sent a navy frigate to New York to repatriate its gold reserves. The depletion of U.S. gold reserves at a time of “American malaise” (e.g., political assassinations, racial riots, the Vietnam War fiasco), led President Richard Nixon to “close the gold window”  in 1971, putting an end to Bretton Woods I.

The Chaotic Interlude (1971-1980)

America’s insouciance with regards to unilaterally breaking the dollar’s tie to gold and imposing a pure fiat currency system was expressed by Treasury Secretary John Connally’s comment, “it’s our currency but it’s your problem.” The result was a collapse of confidence in American monetary stewardship and a flight to dollar alternatives. Dollars as a percentage of total central bank reserves fell from 50% in 1971 to 25% in 1980, replaced mainly by gold but also by Deutsche mark and Japanese yen.

The Petrodollar System and The Golden Age of the dollar (1980-2000)

An agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States in 1974 (the U.S. Saudi Arabian Joint-Commission on Economic Cooperation) committed Saudi Arabia to invoice petroleum sales in U.S. dollars and hold current account surpluses in U.S. Treasuries in exchange for defense guarantees and economic support. The pact  guaranteed ample global demand for dollars and reinstated America’s  “exorbitant privilege”  of running perpetual current account deficits (chart 3).

Fed chairman Paul Volcker’s success in quelling inflation and President Ronal Reagan’s neoliberal pro-business agenda put an end to the 1970s malaise and set the stage for the golden age of the dollar. This period was characterized by a persistent decline in inflation and interest rates, underpinned by stable prices for oil and gold and deflationary forces from both domestic sources (deregulation, lower taxes, decline of unions, immigration) and international sources (globalization, lower tariffs, free flow of capital) (chart 4)

Confidence in the dollar returned and central banks increased the weight of dollar reserves, from a low of 25% in 1980 to a peak of 60% in 2000, while gold reserves fell from 60% in 1980 to 12% in 2000. Low and declining inflation gave birth to the Fed’s “great moderation” thesis and allowed it to promote the great financialization of the economy, all buttressed by growing current account deficits and foreign capital inflows. With Wall Street at the core of the process, this period saw the U.S. become a huge net debtor as foreign countries accumulated surpluses and became the financiers of U.S. debt and other assets. This period also saw the widespread elimination of capital controls around the world and the growing influence of “hot money” tourist capital flows into foreign assets (chart 5).

Chart 5

Bretton Woods II (2000-2012)

China’s “opening up” under Deng Xiaoping during the 1980s, the maxi-devaluation of the RMB in 1994 and accession to the WTO in 2000 drove China’s “economic miracle” and the commodity super-cycle (2002-2012). China’s rise inaugurated a new global monetary regime which has been dubbed Bretton Woods II. Like in Bretton Woods I, the U.S. promoted the growth of a potential rival through trade and investment (under the premise that China would become more democratic and market-oriented over time).  Once again imbalances emerged, as China’s mercantilist policies led to massive current account surpluses with the U.S. which were parked in U.S. Treasury bills.  “Chimerica,” as the symbiotic relationship came to be known, made China the factory floor for the U.S. consumer.  The China “trade shock” accentuated the deflationary forces of the 1990s. This enabled the Federal Reserve to pursue loose monetary policy despite soaring commodity prices, which broke the “petrodollar” anchor of price stability of the prior twenty years.

Without the stability of the price of oil and gold that was at the core of the “Petrodollar system” Bretton Woods II was an anchorless pure Fiat Reserve Currency Model relying entirely on the faith and credit of the Federal Reserve. Since 2000, recurring financial crises (2001, 2007, 2020) have been met by a desperate and increasingly unorthodox Federal Reserve determined to combat deflationary forces by supporting extremely high levels of debt and equity prices through quantitative easing and international swap lines.

Rising tensions between China and the U.S. since Xi Jinping took power in China in 2011 have undermined “Chimerica.” Since 2017, China has been reducing its holdings of Treasury bills, and no longer recycles its current account surpluses into Treasury bills.  The sanctions imposed on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine and acrimonious relations with Saudi Arabia have further undermined the appeal of recycling current account surpluses into Treasuries.

In Search of a New Regime: Bretton Woods III?

 As Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has said, “the system in which the dollar is the reserve currency is a system that has long  been recognized to be unsustainable in the long run.” Eventually the “exorbitant privilege” and its geopolitical benefits turn into an “exorbitant burden” of deindustrialization and foreign liabilities.  Moreover, for the first time since WWII, the world’s largest trading nation, China, does not support the  regime. This raises the question of what comes next?

China has declared its determination to move the current world monetary order towards a less U.S. centric model. Given the deterioration in China-U.S. relations and the prospect of economic decoupling, it is likely that China’s trade and current account surpluses with the U.S. will dwindle over the next decade.  Without a reliable substitute for the U.S. consumer, China now aspires to a symbiotic relationship with natural resource producers, whereby it ‘barters” manufactured goods in exchange for commodities. China’s rapprochement with Russia and its diplomatic advances in the Persian Gulf and the steppes of Central Asia are evidence of this focus on creating a new global payments system which focuses on commodities and bypasses the highly financialized dollar correspondent network promoted by the U.S. China aspires to do the same with large economies like Brazil and Indonesia. A Xi visit to Saudi Arabia, rumored to be scheduled for next month, would be of great concern to Washington.

Zolltan Pozsar of Credit Suisse has recently written about a new global commodity anchored reserve currency model which he calls Bretton Woods III. The idea is that in a world torn by geopolitics, sanctions and financial instability  countries will do more trade in other currencies than the dollar and prefer to hold reserves in commodities. Geopolitical tensions this year  — Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions on its trade and foreign reserves, and growing tension in the Taiwan Strait which have resulted  in the  imposition of draconian controls by the U.S. on semiconductor exports  — may have been a watershed which will accelerate financial decoupling.

Does China want the renminbi to serve as a reserve currency?

China, at least in the short run, “wants to have its cake and eat it too.”

China would like to reduce its vulnerability to U.S. sanctions by promoting a new monetary order that is not dollar-centric and do this in a way that allows it to continue to expand its geopolitical influence on Asia and its primary trading partners, mainly commodity producers. However, facing a decade of low growth due to debt, a real estate crisis, poor demographics and plummeting productivity, it also wants to preserve the millions of jobs tied to exports of manufacturing goods. Like all Asian Tigers (Japan, Korea, Taiwan) it needs to pursue the mercantilist policies of the past: an undervalued currency and export subsidies. For now, these mercantilist tendencies imply current account surpluses, which would make it difficult for China to create the expansion of RMB liabilities required in a reserve currency system.

However, under the firm hand of Chairman Xi, China is now rapidly moving to a different economic model that is different from the one followed since the 1980s and at odds with the East Asian model. As it ages rapidly and faces a sharp decline in its workforce, China  will cease to be both the “factory of the world” and the major creditor to the world. This trend will accelerate this decade as China adopts widespread autarkic policies to reduce its vulnerability to potential sanctions from geopolitical adversaries. Over the next decade, China is likely to move to a less production-oriented and more consumer- and finance -oriented economy. This implies more balanced trade and more appropriate conditions for promoting the RMB as a reserve currency.

Conclusion

The move to a multipolar world and parallel monetary regimes will add instability to the global economy during the coming decade. Though declining global trade imbalances are positive in the medium run, the reduction in global dollar liquidity will support dollar strength at first but accelerate alternative reserve currency holdings over time. Commodities will probably play a more important role in future monetary regimes, which will benefit the major global commodity producers.

There is great uncertainty about the reshaping of a new monetary order, but certainty about one thing: more instability.  The quote from Stiglitz concludes: “The system in which the dollar is the reserve currency is a system that has long been recognized to be unsustainable in the long run. It’s a system that is fraying, but as it frays it can contribute a great deal to global instability, and the movement from a dollar to a two-currency or three-currency, a dollar – euro [sic], is a movement that will make things even more unstable.”

Brazil’s Bad Choices

“A second marriage is the triumph of hope over experience.” Samuel Johnson

Brazilian voters have the sorry task of choosing between two deeply flawed political figures in a runoff presidential election on October 30. The frustration is increased in that the two candidates already have proven their incompetence for the job, so the choice can only be grounded in hope over experience.

The alternative is between Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the caudillo who has run the Workers Party (PT) for decades, including a 14-year stretch (2002-2016) marked by rampant corruption, and Jair Bolsonaro, a right-wing evangelical populist with a truculent manner, an unsavory environmental record, and a deep nostalgia for the “order and progress” of military dictatorship (1964-1985). Most voters are motivated by fear and rancor and resigned to choosing the least-worse option; either “a corrupt thief” (Lula) or “a genocidal fascist” (Bolsonaro), as the candidates defined each other in a recent public debate.

The political, media and business elites in Brazil mainly have sided with Lula, if with a pronounced lack of enthusiasm. The rationale is that Lula is “more democratic,” though this overlooks his fervent admiration of Cuba’s Castros and other Latin American dictators and his antagonism towards Brazil’s vibrant free press.   Bolsonaro is lambasted for adulating Trump and siding with right-wing strong-men around the world. Bolsonaro also is accused of plotting to bring back a military dictatorship to Brazil, though there is no evidence that the military would countenance this unless social order declined precipitously, and the middle classes took to the streets clamoring for an intervention.

Lula’s key campaign promise is that he will bring back the consumption boom experienced during his presidency (2002-2010) which resulted from a surge in commodity prices and a massive positive terms-of-trade shock. This was a period of prosperity when purchasing power expanded greatly for low-skill workers and investment bankers alike. As Lula tirelessly repeats: “They know that never in the history of this country they made so much money as when I was president. Bankers made money, businessmen made money, farmers made money.”

However, Lula grossly mismanaged the commodity boom, and it was followed by a severe case of “Dutch Disease’ (the natural resource curse) from which Brazil still has not recovered.

“Dutch Disease,” named after the economic instability caused by the discovery of gas fields in the Netherlands in the 1960s, is well documented, and responsible natural resource producers (e.g., Norway, UAE) have learned to avoid it by taking preventive measures e.g., offshore sovereign funds.  The discovery of the huge pre-salt offshore deposits by Petrobras in 2005 and the China-induced commodity super-cycle (2002-2012) caused a massive terms-of-trade shock for Brazil.  Unfortunately, Lula fell right into the trap, and Brazil followed the classic course of Dutch Disease as outlined by academics.

  1. Currency overvaluation, resulting in the decline of the trade sector and deindustrialization, followed by devaluation.
  2. A credit-fueled consumption boom, followed by lower growth and reduced living standards.
  3. Monetary expansion and asset bubbles followed by crashes.
  4. Increase in corruption and rent seeking, undermining confidence in judicial and political institutions.

Corruption scandals marred the 14 years of PT rule. Moreover, Lula undid important administrative and economic reforms that had been achieved under his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

 Since the end of the PT’s rule in 2016, Brazil’s economy has been in a depressionary state. But slowly the foundations of growth have been restored by competent monetary and fiscal policies and a series of important reforms. These include pension, labor and bankruptcy law reforms, and laws setting a ceiling on fiscal spending, guaranteeing Central Bank Independence and for the regulation of water and sewage utilities. Since 2016, Brazil has also seen its most important wave of privatizations since the 1990s. This includes the spectacular privatization of Eletrobras, the national electricity utility, which for decades had been a bountiful source of graft for politicians. Next on the list of privatizations is Petrobras, which was at the core of the corruption scandals of the PT years. These reforms aim to make the economy more competitive and productive. Lula opposes them all and aims to overturn them.

The choice is a tortuous one for the Brazilian voter. If character is the determining factor, many will stay home or nullify their votes. If voters understand the benefits that may accrue from the current course of economic reforms, the choice may be easier.

EM Expected Returns, 3Q 2022. The Revenge of Value.

Emerging market stocks have continued to underperform the S&P500 over the past year and the past quarter,  as global capital flows to the safety of U.S. assets in a world of rising economic instability and risk aversion. However, below the surface  interesting trends are emerging that point to better days ahead.

After a decade of poor returns, value investing (contrarian investing in cheap stocks in cyclical industries with little growth) is working again in emerging markets. The MSCI EM value index has outperformed the MSCI EM core index by 3% over the year, and, more importantly, the cheapest countries in the EM index are now by far the best performers. This is in stark contrast to the past five years when cheap only became cheaper and rich only became richer.  We can see this in the chart below which shows the performance of the four cheapest markets in EM relative to the MSCI EM index. Turkey (TUR), Brazil  (EWZ) and Chile (ECH) have beaten the EM index by huge margins over this period.  Colombia (GXG), which recently elected a leftist anti-business president, has still managed to perform in line with the market.

This trend should boost the confidence of EM investors. Emerging markets are by nature a value asset (highly weighted to cyclical businesses) and should not be performing well in an environment of rising risk aversion.  But investors are now betting that these markets are too cheap to avoid because low valuations promise high expected returns that more than compensate short-term risks.

The chart below shows the current expected returns for EM markets and for the S&P500 based on a CAPE ratio analysis. The Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings Ratio (CAPE)  takes the average of inflation-adjusted earnings for the past ten years, which serves to smooth out the cyclicality of earnings. This is a particularly useful tool for highly cyclical assets like EM stocks.  We use dollarized data to capture currency trends. This methodology has been used by investors for ages and has been popularized more recently by Professor Robert Shiller at Yale University.

As we have seen in recent years, CAPE is not a good timing tool, but it does tend to work well over time, particularly at extreme valuations.  CAPEs below five, such as Turkey today, have historically been a failsafe indicator of high future returns. CAPE ratios that are completely out of sync with historical averages for the country are also powerful predictors of future returns. Aside from Turkey, Colombia, Philippines and Korea look very cheap on this basis. On the other hand, India , the most popular market with investors today, is an absolute outlier on the expensive side.

That cheap markets are now performing well in a risky environment is very encouraging for EM investors. If value continues to do well, EM stocks will likely do very well when the coming synchronized global and U.S. recessions  hit bottom.

Characteristics of Emerging Markets

The Emerging Markets asset class, for both bonds and equities, is made up of a smorgasbord of countries that don’t have much to do with one another. Very broadly, the index providers (MSCI, FTSE, Russell, etc.,)  differentiate between developed, emerging and frontier markets in terms of “investability”  criteria, such as market capitalization, liquidity and transparency. In this article, we provide a framework to further categorize  emerging markets. We look first at the basic economic structure of countries: the growth in the quantity of labor and the expected growth in the productivity of that labor. Second, we look at the capacity of countries to compete and move up value chains in a global economy.

1.Economic Structure

First, in the chart below, we look at GDP per capita, the most basic measure of a country’s relative development. We see that Taiwan, Korea and perhaps Poland are really closer to developed countries on this measure. Then , moving from left to right on the chart, we can somewhat arbitrarily group the other countries into middle-income (Chile to Thailand) and lower income (Peru to India).

Second, in the chart below, we distinguish between dynamic, stagnant and languid economies by measuring how GDP per capita for each country has evolved relative to the United States since 1980. Dynamic economies are converging with United States, the stagnant ones are “trapped” in relative terms and the languid ones are falling behind. The term “Middle-Income Trap” refers mainly to middle-income countries in Latin America that have stopped converging over this period, but there are also rich and poor countries that are neither outgrowing or growing less than the United States.

The following chart shows the long term effect of convergence for dynamic economies (Korea and China)  and a “trapped” country (Brazil). India has recently started a process of convergence, but it remains to be seen for how long it can be sustained.

GDP growth can be broken down into the growth of the supply of labor and the growth in the productivity of labor. The following three charts provide insight into labor growth for different EM countries: first, the expected annual growth in the working age population for the next decade; second, the degree of urbanization; and third, the female participation rate.  These charts show  radical extremes: On one end, a country like India ,with a growing population, very low urbanization and very low female participation, has potentially very large employment growth; at the other end, Korea ,  with negative growth in the working age population, a high degree of urbanization and a high rate of female participation, is likely to have very low employment growth.

In addition to the growth in the quantity of labor we need a notion of labor  productivity growth. The chart below shows annual labor productivity growth for the past ten years, which is a valid starting point for estimating future productivity growth.

Not surprisingly, labor productivity is linked to capital formation, as shown in the following chart.

Assuming that these rates of productivity growth persist in the future (admittedly a big assumption) and adding these to the working age population growth, we can derive a very general idea of potential future growth, which we show in the next chart.

2.Competitiveness

Another distinguishing characteristic of countries is the conditions they offer for private capital to unleash its entrepreneurial drive (“animal spirits) ,to boost productivity and innovation. These conditions —  Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation), or “Ease of Doing Business” (World Bank) — require  good governance and an efficient bureaucracy which provides rule of law, infrastructure and social services (education, healthcare). The result of good governance is a dynamic entrepreneurial sector which is innovative and globally competitive.

For countries to become increasingly competitive in the global economy they need 1. Human Capital; 2. Innovation and economic complexity; and 3. Growing participation in world trade for manufactured goods.

Human capital (education, health, etc.,) is measured by the World Bank’s Human Capital ranking. Also, the OECD’s  PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) provides an indication of the educational achievement levels of many countries. Both  of these are shown below.

Economic Freedom has been measured by the Heritage Foundation, the World Bank (Ease of Doing Business) and the World Economic Forum, among others, always with the objective of appraising the conditions for private investment and entrepreneurship. Below, we provide some of the findings of the Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index.

Innovation and Economic Complexity both are important indicators of a

country’s potential for moving from middle-income to higher-income status. Many EM countries, particularly those in Latin America, have not been able to innovate and move up industrial global value chains, falling into the “Middle-Income Trap.”

The Bloomberg Innovation Index ranks the major economies of the world in terms of innovation capacity. As usual, it is important to understand the historical trends of the indicator. The two charts below show the latest innovation rankings and the evolution of the rankings for the United States and China.

The Economic Complexity Index (ECI) measures the knowledge intensity of an economy. The first chart shows the rankings for a sample of major developed and EM economies. The second chart shows the evolution of the index since 1998 for three “converging” countries  (China, Korea and Poland) and two laggards (Brazil and the U.S.). Both the U.S. and Brazil are major commodity producers vulnerable to the “natural resource curse.”

 

Participation in World Trade is another critical indicator of competitiveness and growth potential. The evidence throughout history points to a clear connection between trade and prosperity. In the following two charts we contrast convergers with commodity producers. The convergers (China, Taiwan, Korea, Poland) have grown their participation in world trade while the commodity producers have low (and very volatile) participation.

Conclusion

From a macro viewpoint emerging markets include countries with very different profiles. In the chart below, we show which countries do well in growth and competitiveness. Hypothetically, the countries with growing economies that are competitive in a global economy should be attractive for investors. Unfortunately, many other factors come into play, the most important of which is the capacity for corporations to accumulate capital over long periods of time through high profitability and reinvestment opportunities. It is also important to understand financial stability and pay great attention to debt cycles, foreign flows and balance of payment dynamics.

 

 

 

 

 

Long Technology Waves and Emerging Markets

The poor performance of many developing economies in recent decades has many explanations. Thought leaders such as prominent mainstream economists, the World Bank and the IMF tend to attribute failure to weak “institutions” which engender corruption, bureaucracy, lawlessness and poor human capital formation, and, consequently, result in a difficult environment for productive investments and capital accumulation to occur. In the countries themselves structural reasons often are preferred which tend to blame external forces: the legacy of colonialism and foreign oppression or the inequitable dependency of the “periphery” (developing countries) on the “center”  (rich countries). A third approach, put forward by experts on historical technological cycles, gives significant incremental insights on the question, and, more importantly, guidance on a path to better performance in the future.

The Russian Nikolai Kondratiev and the Austrian Joseph Schumpeter developed the idea during the 1920s that  long technological waves drive  the course of economic growth. Both of these “political economists” sought to understand the miraculous growth created by the industrial revolution over the previous century to better explain the post W.W. I  environment.

Schumpeter is best remembered for the idea that “creative destruction” is fundamental for progress and occurs in a recurring process: innovations made by scientists and tinkerers are turned into inventions by profit seeking entrepreneurs; eventually, the wide diffusion of disruptive technologies lead to widespread creative destruction as entire industries and sectors are transformed.

The chart below, from Visual Capitalist, summarizes the long-term technological cycles defined by Kondratiev and Schumpeter. Though the precise dates are debated by historians, the chart seeks to cover the entire era of the “Industrial Revolution.”  Five distinct “long waves of innovation” are described, each one of which was deeply transformative, not only for the firms and industries involved but also for the socio-political fabric of society. This framework puts us today in the fifth wave of technological progress, the Information and Communication Technologies Age (ICT).

Following  in the path of Schumpeter, the Venezuelan economist Carlota Perez and others have advanced the discussion of technological waves by incorporating the role of capital markets and exploring the implications for the development of “periphery” countries. Perez’s book, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital (2001), has been hugely influential and is required reading in Silicon Valley boardrooms and venture capital firms.

Perez talks about technological revolutions as “great surges of development” which cause structural changes to the economy and profound qualitative changes to society, and she sees capital markets at the core of the process. Her “revolutionary waves,” as shown in the chart below are in line with Schumpeter’s, but she increases the scope to show the broad reach of these technologies on communications and infrastructure and, consequently, trade and commerce and society as a whole.

Perez’s technological cycles are divided into three distinct phases, which are determined by the diffusion rate of technologies.

During the initial phase – Installation – new innovations are slowly adopted by entrepreneurs with disruptive business models. As the kinks are worked out and the technologies become cost effective more entrepreneurs adopt the technologies with the backing of financiers (e.g. venture capital) who seek the high potential payoff of backing a future champion. This leads to a frenzy of capital markets speculation, which invariably results in overinvestment, hype, financial bubbles and financial crisis.

As shown below, every Installation phase has ended in a bubble, followed by a financial crisis, which Perez call the Turning Point. The canal mania of the British industrial revolution, the British railway mania of the Age of Steam, the global infrastructure mania (sometimes called the Barings mania) of the Age of Steel, the roaring twenties stock market bubbles of the age of mass production and the  Telecom, Media and Technology (TMT) bubble of  the ICT revolution all ended in financial crises.

For illustration purposes, the chart below shows Perez’s process at work for the current Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) revolution that we are currently living. The cycle is a typical S-curve which has a long incubation period of slow growth, followed by a sharp ramp up and an eventual flattening.  The current cycle can be said to have started in 1971 with the launch of the first commercial micro-processor chip by Intel, but this was only possible because of a prior decades-long incubation period of scientific research and tinkering. Financial speculation built up between 1995-1999 led to the great TMT bubble and the crash in 2000-2001. Following the crash, the Deployment Phase has caused the rise of the major winners through a consolidation process (FAANGS). (These consolidations are normal, according to Perez. For example, hundreds of auto companies engaged in brutal competition before consolidating into the three majors in the 1920s).

The Deployment Periods, which Perez calls the “Golden Ages”, is when the technologies become cheap and ubiquitous, and their benefits are widely diffused through business and society. Perez argues that we are on the verge of another “golden age” today, as we approach broad access to smartphones and the internet and massively powerful micro-chips are becoming almost ubiquitous in basic consumer products (the chip in an Iphone has a trillion times the computing power of those used by IBM’s mainframe computers in 1965.)

If it doesn’t feel now like we are entering another “Golden Age” it is because we are still experiencing the after-shocks of the previous phase of financial frenzy and economic collapse and its consequences: high inequality and populism. Perez argues that the successful countries of the next decades will be those that have governments that understand the moment and can actively promote the diffusion of ICT technologies to achieve broad societal goals (e.g. “green” technologies).

Technology Cycles and Emerging Markets

Looking back at history, one can see how this process has played out before for developing countries. We will focus on the last three technology cycles: The age of steel and mass engineering, the age of oil and mass production and the current ICT revolution.

The age of steel and mass engineering (1875-1908): This was the age of the wide diffusion of the steam engine and steel through mass engineering to provide the infrastructure for the first wave of trade globalization. The rise of Japan (the first of the Asian Tigers) occurred over this period as it methodically diffused all of the technologies developed in the West.  Latin America experienced its own “Belle Epoque,” as steamships and railroads made its commodities competitive in global markets. During this time, Argentina and Brazil were considered at the level of development of most European countries and attracted millions of European immigrants.

The age of oil and mass production (1908-1971) – Interrupted by two devasting world wars and marked by profound socio-political change, this age still generated wide-spread prosperity, though China, India and Eastern Europe did not participate. Initiated by the launch of Henry Ford’s Model T automobile in 1908, it saw the diffusion of the internal combustion engine, electrification, and chemicals under the structure of the modern corporation. Following the Second World War, broad diffusion of these technologies led to a “Golden Age” of capitalism throughout the Western World. This was also a period  of “miraculous” growth throughout Latin America as the wide diffusion of the mass production process, supported by import substitution policies and foreign multinationals, created abundant quality jobs in manufacturing and the rise of the middle class consumer.

The  Information and Communication Technologies  (ICT) Revolution (1971-today): All phases of technological revolutions overlap with their predecessor and follower as the diffusion process plays out. In the case of the ICT revolution the overlap has been particularly important and has created unexpected winners and losers. China’s economic reforms (1982) and the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) had the effect of radically expanding the length and scope of the Mass Production Age at a time when the “creative destruction” of the ICT Age should have been undermining it. Instead of increasing productivity German corporations moved mass production to Eastern Europe and American corporations outsourced to China, to exploit cheap labor. Companies also were able to avoid expensive environmental costs by offshoring carbon-intensive, heavily polluting industries to China and the Middle East, delaying the diffusion of “green” technologies for decades. The Mass Production Age, with its high environmental costs, was extended to the enormous benefit of China and a few countries in Eastern Europe, at the expense of workers in Europe and America who were pushed into low-productivity service jobs, and the “Golden Age” of the ICT revolution has been delayed. ( U.S. productivity and growth have declined and inequality has risen sharply while Amazon makes it ever easier to buy Chinese-made goods.)

The slow diffusion of the ICT age and the extension of the mass production age has had very uneven consequences for emerging market countries. The winners of the ICT age have been those countries that were late comers to the mass production paradigm and understood that the ICT revolution would lead to massive reductions in communication and transport costs and a new wave of globalization. The Asian Tigers (Korea, Taiwan, China, Vietnam) and to a lesser degree Eastern European countries (Poland, Czech, Hungary) have been the champions by integrating themselves in global mass production value chains and assiduously working to add value. South-East Asian countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia) initially did well but increasingly find themselves sandwiched between newcomers like Vietnam and Bangladesh, which are competitive in low value-added products, and China for higher value-added products. Both India and the Philippines almost completely missed out on the mass production age revival but have made small niches for themselves in the ICT world with Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) and IT Services Outsourcing.

The big loser of the ICT age has been Latin America, which has undergone severe deindustrialization and has become mired in the middle-income trap. Mexico has suffered the greatest frustration. This country, led by its brilliant technocrats, did everything right to position itself for the mass production to ICT transition, entering into the groundbreaking NAFTA trade agreement with the U.S. and Canada. The thinking behind NAFTA was brilliant. It would facilitate a smooth transition out of mass production to ICT for U.S. firms while extending the benefits of the mass production age to a friendly neighbor operating under controlled conditions (labor, local content, subsidies, environmental, etc…). Unfortunately for Mexico, the dramatic rise of China as the factory of the world undermined all of these objectives, as China successfully dominated global value supply chains without having to meet any of the conditions Mexico had to comply with.

South America has not fared better. As high-cost producers with very volatile currencies and economies, these countries were unprepared to compete with China. These disadvantages were compounded by (1) the false hope created by the commodity boom  (2002-2012) which resulted in a typical boom-to-bust cycle and a vicious case of Dutch Disease (natural resource curse) that these countries have yet to recover from and (2) the adoption of “Washington Consensus” financial opening dogma (free movement of capital) which increased volatile flows of hot money and destabilized currencies.

The following chart shows economic convergence since 1980 (in terms of USD GDP/Capita) for a sample of developed and emerging market countries, which is illustrative of the winners and losers of the ICT Revolution.

The Golden Age of ICT

If Perez is correct and we are on the verge of a Golden Age of  extensive diffusion of ICT technologies through all segments and geographies what should countries be doing?

Perez and Raphael Kablinsky in his recent book, Sustainable Futures, An Agenda for Action, argue for activist government using its resources to incentivize private investment to achieve desirable societal goals (e.g., environmental sustainability, equal opportunity). The Biden Administration’s recent Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Chips and Science Act are both in that spirit, aiming to promote investment in clean energy and energy efficiency and the re-shoring of  semiconductor production away from the Asian mass production value chain. These initiatives, as well as President Xi’s Made in China 2025 Plan, all assume that the great Mass Production Age extension through China-centric global value chains has run its course, and that ICT diffusion will now result in, without excess short-term costs, a return to more local/regional manufacturing and a more autarkic or segmented global trade system. Through massive state subsidies China already has taken a commanding lead in the production of “green” products such as electric vehicles and batteries and solar panels.

The return of activist government, coming after a 40-year period of neo-liberalism and government retrenchment, raises the question of what policies countries should pursue to fully reap the benefits of this final phase of the ICT Revolution.

Perez recommends two basic courses of action that many emerging economies and developing countries can pursue. First, governments should be active in promoting ICT diffusion in industries where competitive advantages are evident. For example, commodity rich countries like Brazil, Argentina and Chile can increase productivity by being at the forefront of ICT innovations applicable to farming and mining and, at the same time, aggressively move up value chains for these products. (Brazil, with its low carbon-dependent economy and enormous potential in solar, wind and biofuel energies, is well positioned to become a global leader in “green” farming and mining).  Second, Perez sees large opportunities for countries or regional groups to capitalize on climate change initiatives by deploying alternative energy sources and capturing their value chains through localized production. (Once again, Brazil with its large local market opportunity can achieve leadership).

The consulting firm McKinsey provides a roadmap for the future in a recent article, “Accelerating Toward Net-Zero; The Green Business-Building Opportunity” (Link). The following chart from McKinsey maps out the sectors expected to have the largest economic importance in a “greening” economy and, consequently, where governments and firms are advised to focus their efforts.